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COMMENT
United States-People's Republic of China Income
Tax Treaty: Opening the Door to Increased
Economic Cooperation
I. Introduction
In the last decade the People's Republic of China (PRC) has wit-
nessed unprecedented levels of economic growth and industrial
modernization. This phenomenon is due largely to progressive eco-
nomic reforms and an increasingly receptive attitude toward working
with more developed nations. I By October 1986 the PRC had nego-
tiated or concluded income tax treaties with both developed and de-
veloping nations to resolve the double taxation problems facing
business entities that operate in these countries. 2
As the PRC's economy has grown so has the United States' in-
terest in commerce between the two nations. 3 Nevertheless, differ-
ences between the two countries' legal systems, particularly in the
area of taxation, have obstructed closer economic cooperation. In an
effort to overcome some of these internal legal obstacles, the United
States and the PRC recently concluded a comprehensive tax treaty,
I Zheng, The Sino-U.S. Income Tax Treaty and Its Effect on Chinese Taxation of American
Economic Interests, 40 TAX LAW. 733, 733-34 (1986). Reform is especially apparent in the
PRC's commercial law framework developed over the last few years. In the past four years
the PRC has enacted more than 100 statutes concerning foreign economic relations. Id.
Recent changes in the PRC's trademark and patent law facilitate foreign investment in the
PRC. For a discussion of the current trademark and patent laws of the PRC, see Woods,
Trademark and Patent Law in the People's Republic of China, 13 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 473
(1988).
2 Voyu Shisiguo Qianding Bimian Shuangchong Zhengshui Xieding [China Concluding Treaties
of Avoiding Double Taxation With Fourteen Nations], People's Daily, Oct. 23, 1986, at 3. Na-
tions negotiating or concluding tax treaties with the PRC include: France, the Federal
Republic of Germany, Sweden, Belgium, Japan, Norway, the United Kingdom, Austria,
Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Malaysia, Singapore, Switzerland, the Nether-
lands, Romania, Thailand, and Yugoslavia. Several of these treaties contain tax-sparing
provisions that entitle taxpayers to a complete exemption from taxes on the foreign in-
come in the home country. Id.
3 U.S. exports to the PRC increased from $824 million in 1978 to approximately $3
billion in 1984. U.S. imports from the PRC increased from $357 million to $3.381 billion
over the same period. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, DIRECTOR OF TRADE STATISTICS
YEARBOOK 399 (1985). The PRC is the twenty-second largest trading partner of the
United States. The United States is the PRC's third largest partner. BUREAU OF PUBLIC
AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE, U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS 2 (July 1984).
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Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Preven-
tion of Tax Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income (Treaty),
which allows residents of these nations to avoid the burden of double
taxation .4
The Treaty, which borrows elements from model treaties
drafted by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD), the United Nations, and the United States, 5 seeks
4 Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Tax Eva-
sion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Apr. 30, 1984, United States-People's Republic of
China - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. -, reprinted in I TAX TREATIES (CCH) 1401-1431
(1986) [hereinafter Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation]. The Articles dis-
cussed in this Comment are as follows.
Taxing Jurisdiction
Treaty Definitions - Article 4.
Residence - Article 4. (See infra p. 530).
Permanent Establishment - Article 5. (See infra p. 532).
Substantive Rules of Taxation
Business Profits - Article 7. (See infra p. 533).
Dividends - Article 9. (See infra p. 536).
Interest - Article 10. (See infra p. 536).
Royalties - Article 11. (See infra p. 536).
Personal Services - Articles 13 and 14. (See infra p. 534).
Directors' Fees - Article 15. (See infra p. 535).
Entertainer and Athlete Exemption - Article 16. (See infra p. 535).
Pensions - Article 17. (See infra p. 535).
Remuneration Other than Pensions - Article 18. (See infra p. 535).
Teacher and Researcher Exemption - Article 19. (See infra p. 535).
Student and Trainee Exemption - Article 20. (See infra p. 535).
Coordinated Tax Measures
Tax Credits - Article 22. (See infra p. 538).
Nondiscrimination Provisions - Article 23. (See infra p. 539).
Mutual Agreement Procedure - Article 24. (See infra p. 540).
Exchanges of Information - Article 25. (See infra p. 540).
Id.
This is not the first international agreement between the PRC and the United States
regarding trade and investment issues. See, e.g., Agreement Concerning Fisheries Off the
Coasts of the United States, July 23, 1985, H.R. Doc. No. 106, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1985); Accord on Industrial and Technological Cooperation, Jan. 12, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 144
(1984); Agreement Relating to Trade in Cotton, Wool and Man-Made Fiber Textiles and
Textile Products, Aug. 19, 1983, U.S. Dep't. of State Press Release No. 370 (Oct. 18,
1983); Agreement Relating to Investment Guaranties, Oct. 30, 1980, 32 U.S.T. 4010,
T.I.A.S. No. 9924; Agreement on Trade Relations,July, 7, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 4651, T.I.A.S.
No. 9630.
5 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Model
Double Taxation Convention on Income and Capital 1977, reprinted in 1 TAX TREATIES
(CCH) 151 (1980) [hereinafter OECD Model Double Taxation Convention]; United Na-
tions Model Double Taxation Convention Between Developed and Developing Countries,
U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/102, 3 (1980), reprinted in I TAX TREATIES (CCH) 171 (1982) [herein-
after U.N. Model Double Taxation Convention]; U.S. Department of the Treasury, Model
Income Tax Treaty of June 16, 1981, reprinted in I TAX TREATIES (CCH) 158 (1982)
[hereinafter U.S. Model Double Taxation Convention]. The Treaty's similarity to other
model treaties demonstrates the PRC's recognition of conventional rules of taxation. Cox,
The United States-People's Republic of China Double Taxation Treaty, 5 INT'L TAX. & Bus. LAW.
111, 119 (1987). For a discussion of the model treaties on international taxation, see
Whitaker, An Examination of the O.E.C.D. and U.N. Model Tax Treaties: History, Provisions and
Application to U.S. Foreign Policy, 8 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 39 (1982).
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to reduce double taxation of income and tax evasion. The Treaty
incorporates coordinated tax measures such as tax credits, nondis-
crimination provisions, mutual agreement arrangements, and ex-
changes of information provisions. 6 The parties to the Treaty also
signed an accompanying protocol (1984 Protocol), which contains a
"savings clause" and provisions to discourage "treaty shopping."' 7
Responding to charges that provisions against treaty shopping were
inadequate, 8 both nations negotiated and signed an additional pro-
tocol (1986 Protocol)9 to interpret the anti-treaty shopping provi-
sions of the 1984 Protocol. Subsequently, the Treaty was ratified
and entered into force on November 21, 1986 for income derived in
taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 1987.10
This Comment explains how certain provisions of the U.S.-PRC
tax treaty facilitate the United States' dual goals of greater economic
cooperation and normalization of political relations with the world's
most populous nation." First, this Comment discusses the coverage
6 Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, supra note 4, at arts. 22-25.
7 Protocol to the Agreement for Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention
of Tax Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Apr. 30, 1984, United States-People's
Republic of China, __ U.S.T. __, T.I.A.S. No. _, reprinted in 1 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 1440
(1986) [hereinafter 1984 Protocol]. Under the savings clause provision the United States
retains the right to tax its citizens and residents as if the Treaty was not in effect. SENATE
COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON THE INCOME TAX AGREEMENT (AND PROTOCOL)
WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, S. EXEC. REP. No. 7, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1985), reprinted in TAX TREATIES (CCH) 1448 (1986) [hereinafter
SENATE REPORT].
8 Treaty shopping is the use of a tax treaty by a business entity in a third country to
avoid paying taxes in another country. BISCHEL & FEINSCHREIBER, FUNDAMENTALS OF IN-
TERNATIONAL TAXATION 272-75 (1985). Third country business entities often seek to avoid
receiving income in their own country in their own name. The entity routes the income to
a holding company, trust, or nominee in a tax haven country in which the United States
has a tax treaty. As a result, the entity enjoys the low rates or exemptions from income tax
provided by the treaty. Id.
9 Protocol Respecting the Interpretation of Paragraph 7 of the Protocol to the
Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government
of the People's Republic of China for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Preven-
tion of Tax Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, May 10, 1986, United States-Peo-
ple's Republic of China, _ U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. __, reprinted in 1 TAX TREATIES (CCH)
1441 (1986) [hereinafter 1986 Protocol].
10 Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, supra note 4, at art. 27. On
December 11, 1985, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations recommended that the
Senate give its consent to ratify the Treaty. SENATE REPORT, supra note 7. The Committee
based its recommendation on the understanding that Hong Kong would be excluded from
the Treaty. The Committee also noted the following concerns: That certain concessions
granted not be the starting point for future negotiations with developing countries; that
the United States monitor changes in PRC law to ensure the Treaty adequately discour-
aged treaty shopping; and that the Treaty not restrict the U.S. tax reform process. Id. A
full Senate vote was blocked by SenatorJesse Helms (R.-N.C.) who argued that the Treaty
lacked adequate anti-treaty shopping provisions. Schmitt, Helms on a New Target: Tax Treaty
with China, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1986 at 12, col. 3 (national ed.).
I I See Note, United States Tax Treaty Policy Toward Developing Countries: The China Exam-
ple, 35 UCLA L. REV. 369, 370-71 (1987) (arguing that economic and political foreign
policy objectives motivated and influenced the Treaty negotiation process). In providing
for a relatively broad source basis of taxation, the Treaty departs from the U.S. and OECD
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of the Treaty, with particular emphasis on the jurisdictional concepts
of "residence" and "permanent establishment." Second, the
Treaty's substantive provisions for the avoidance of double taxation
are examined. Third, this Comment discusses the Treaty's "coordi-
nated tax measures" including provisions for tax credits, nondis-
.crimination, mutual agreements, and exchanges of information.
Finally, the two protocols for the prevention of treaty shopping are
explained.
II. The Treaty's Jurisdictional Reach
As in any tax treaty, the initial inquiry in the U.S.-PRC agree-
ment is whether jurisdiction can be asserted over the contracting
parties. The two key jurisdictional concepts in the Treaty are "resi-
dence" and "permanent establishment."
A. Residence
Taxpayers who qualify as residents of the United States, the
PRC, or both are eligible for the Treaty's benefits. 12 "Resident" is
defined in Article 4 of the Treaty as any person or entity that is liable
for tax in a contracting state because of "domicile, residence, place
of head office, place of incorporation or any other criterion of a simi-
lar nature."' 13 This definition is taken from the United Nations
Model Treaty,' 4 but does not differ materially from that of the U.S.
Model Treaty. ' 5
Dual residency occurs when the taxpayer is considered a resi-
dent of both the United States and the PRC under the domestic laws
of each.1 6 According to the 1984 Protocol, the "competent authori-
ties " 17 should follow the U.N. Model Treaty tie-breaker rules to de-
Model Treaties. As a result, U.S. activities in the PRC may be taxed more heavily than
under the U.S. and OECD Model Treaties. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 7. Foreign
policy goals may have influenced the United States to increased source based taxation.
Tax treaties benefit treaty partners by increasing the international economic and political
respectability of the treaty partners. This may explain why during the detente period of
1970s the United States concluded tax treaties with the Soviet Union, Poland, and
Romania despite limited trade and investment between the United States and these coun-
tries. Note, supra note 11, at 380. PRC residents are not expected to invest heavily in the
United States a's a result of the Treaty. 132 CONG. REC. S9614 (daily ed. July 24, 1986).
12 Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, supra note 4, at art, 1.
13 Id. at art. 4, para. 1.
14 U.N. Model Double Taxation Convention, supra note 5, at art. 1.
15 See Kelly, A Comparative Analysis of the United States-People's Republic of China Tax Treaty:
United States Tax Treaty Policy Concerning Developing Countries, 13 SYRACUSEJ. INT'L L. & COM.
83, 87 (1986).
16 For a discussion of the residency requirements under PRC tax law, see Zheng,
supra note 1, at 744-49. Section 6017A of the Internal Revenue Code sets forth the resi-
dency requirement under U.S. tax law. I.R.C. § 6017A (1987).
17 Under the Treaty the U.S. competent authority is the Secretary of the Treasury or
his authorized representative. Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, supra
note 4, at art. 3, para. 1. The U.S. competent authority function, however, has been dele-
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termine treatment of a dual-resident individual.' 8 Under the Treaty,
the taxpayer bears the responsibility of recognizing whether a dual
residency problem exists and if so, of bringing the matter to the at-
tention of the competent authorities.' 9
The methods of resolving dual residency differ between individ-
ual and corporate taxpayers. 20 Individual taxpayers can resolve dual
residency problems without much difficulty. Residency for individ-
ual taxpayers is determined according to Article 4 of the U.N. Model
Treaty. 2 1 Under the U.N. Model Treaty, residence is defined as the
contracting state where the taxpayer has, in order of priority, a per-
manent home, a center of vital interests, an habitual abode, or na-
tionality. 2 2 If none of these factors are determinative, the competent
authorities are to resolve questions of residency by mutual
agreement. 23
For dual-resident corporate taxpayers, the Treaty merely pro-
vides that the authorities must reach an agreement. 2 4 No tie-break-
ing rules apply. If the authorities fail to reach an agreement, the
company is not treated as a resident of either contracting state.
25
Thus, whether a dual-resident corporation can enjoy the significantly
reduced withholding rate under the Treaty depends entirely on the
competent authorities' reaching an agreement. 26 Consistent with
gated to the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue, who has redelegated the authority to
the Associate Commissioner (Operations). SENATE REPORT, supra note 7. The PRC com-
petent authority is the Ministry of Finance. Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxa-
tion, supra note 4, at art. 3, para. 1.
18 1984 Protocol, supra note 7, at para. 5.
19 Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, supra note 4, at art. 24, para. 1.
20 Under the Treaty a "person" includes "an individual, a company, a partnership
and any other body of persons." Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, supra
note 4, at art. 3, para. 1. The Treaty defines "company" as "any body corporate or any
entity which is treated as a body corporate for tax purposes." Id.
21 1984 Protocol, supra note 7, at para. 5.
22 The United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention provides that:
(a) he shall be deemed to be a resident of the State in which he has made a
permanent home available to him; if he has a permanent home available to
him in both States, he shall be deemed to be a resident of the State with
which his personal and economic relations are closer (center of vital
interests);
(b) if the State in which he has a center of vital interests cannot be deter-
mined, or if he does not have a permanent home available to him in either
State, he shall be deemed to be a resident of the State in which he has a
habitual abode;
(c) if he has an habitual abode in both States or in neither of them, he shall
be deemed to be a resident of the state of which he is a national;
(d) if he is a national of both States or of neither of them, the competent
authorities of the Contracting States shall settle the question by mutual
agreement.
U.N. Model Double Taxation Convention, supra note 5, at art. 4, para. 2. This rule is virtu-
ally identical to the rules of the OECD and U.S. Model Treaties.
23 Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, supra note 4, at art. 4, para. 2.
24 Id. at art. 4, para 3.
25 Id.
26 Zheng, supra note 1, at 748-49.
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the OECD and U.S. Model Treaties, the U.S. Treasury Department
states that it will treat an entity incorporated in the United States as a
U.S. resident.27
The Treaty incorporates a new rule providing that when a com-
pany is a resident of both the United States under the Treaty and of a
third country under a separate treaty with the PRC, the company
cannot be considered a resident of the United States for purposes of
enjoying the benefits under the Treaty.2 8 Rather, the agreement be-
tween the PRC and the third country prevails. The motive behind
this denial of U.S. residency is to prevent a corporation from treaty
shopping by qualifying as a resident under more than one agreement
and then claiming benefits under the agreement that provides the
more favorable treatment.2 9
B. Permanent Establishment
The concept of permanent establishment further defines the
contracting states'jurisdiction to impose taxes under the Treaty. Ar-
ticle 5 of the Treaty defines "permanent establishment" as "a fixed
place of business through which the business of an enterprise is
wholly or partly carried on." °30 This definition incorporates aspects
of both the U.S. and U.N. Model Treaties and measures the degree
of business activity necessary to subject the enterprise to taxation on
profits earned inside the taxing country. 31
The presence or absence of a permanent establishment deter-
mines whether the business profits of a corporate entity residing in
one contracting country are taxable in the other country under the
Treaty. For business profits to be taxable in the country in which the
taxpayer is not a resident, they must be attributable to a permanent
establishment in that country. 32 For example, the business profits of
a resident of Country A cannot be taxed by Country B unless the
profits are attributable to a permanent establishment in Country B.
The Treaty includes as permanent establishments places of
management, branch offices, factories, workshops, and places for the
extraction of natural resources. 33 In addition, some activities consti-
27 U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE AGREEMENT BE-
TWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA FOR THE AVOIDANCE OF
DOUBLE TAXATION AND THE PREVENTION OF TAX EVASION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON IN-
COME (1985), reprinted in 1 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 1447 (July 30, 1985) [hereinafter TECH-
NICAL EXPLANATION].
28 Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, supra note 4, at art. 4, para. 4.
29 Kelly, supra note 15, at 89.
30 Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, supra note 4, at art. 5, para. 1.
31 Zheng, supra note 1, at 749.
32 Zheng suggests that permanent establishment has broader coverage under PRC
tax law. Id. at 750-51. The Treaty, therefore, is a significant limitation on the taxing juris-
diction of the PRC. Id. at 751.
33 Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, supra note 4, at art. 5. This
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tute a permanent establishment if conducted for more than a speci-
fied number of months. 34 Certain agency relationships also may
constitute a permanent establishment. While an independent agent
does not constitute a permanent establishment unless he acts exclu-
sively on behalf of the enterprise, 35 a dependent agent with authority
to conclude contracts is regarded as a permanent establishment.3 6
The Treaty specifically excludes certain other activities from the defi-
nition of permanent establishment. Some of these activities are:
Maintaining a fixed place of business solely for storing or displaying
goods, purchasing goods or collecting information for the enter-
prise, and carrying on preparatory or auxiliary activities.3 7
III. Substantive Rules of Taxation
If the requirements for jurisdiction are satisfied, the substantive
rules of the Treaty supersede the laws of the individual contracting
state. 38 In addition to enforcement provisions, the substantive rules
cover the various types of income that are categorized as business
profits, personal services, and income from certain assets.
39
A. Business Profits
Article 7 provides that "business profits" of an entity residing in
definition is similar to those found in the OECD, U.N., and U.S. Model Treaties. Zheng,
supra note 1, at 749.
34 Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, supra note 4, at art. 5. For ex-
ample, sites used to exploit natural resources and services furnished through employees
may be a permanent establishment if these activities exceed six months of a calendar year.
Id. One commentator suggests that the adoption of the shorter U.N. version, rather than
the twelve month period required under the U.S. and OECD Model Treaties, represents a
new policy of the United States to assist developing countries by expanding their tax ba-
ses. See Cox, supra note 5, at 130. The permanent establishment provisions for services
necessitate careful tax planning so that they do not aggregate beyond the permanent es-
tablishment threshold.
35 Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, supra note 4, art. 5, para. 6.
36 Id. at art. 5, para. 5.
37 Id. at art. 5.
38 PRC tax laws affecting foreign businesses and individuals, in the absence of a
treaty, include an individual income tax, a foreign enterprise tax, a joint venture tax, and a
consolidated industrial and commercial tax. See Gelatt & Pomp, Tax Aspects of Doing Business
with the People's Republic of China, 22 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 421 (1984) (providing an
overview of the PRC tax structure that is applicable to foreign businesses); Han, People's
Republic of China's Foreign Income Tax Law and Regulations, 6 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REV.
689 (1983); Pomp, Gelatt & Surrey, The Evolving Tax System of the People s Republic of China,
16 TEX. INT'L L.J. 11 (1981). The Treaty, however, will be supreme if the Treaty conflicts
with current PRC income tax laws or regulations. Zheng, supra note 1, at 736-37. PRC law
also provides for preferential treatment in designated geographic areas called Special Eco-
nomic Zones and Economic and Technological Development Zones. See Klitgaard & Ras-
mussen, Preferential Treatment for Foreign Investment in the People's Republic of China: Special
Economic Zones and Industrial Development Districts, 7 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 377
(1984); Sonoko, China's Special Economic Zones: Experimental Units for Economic Reform, 32
INT'L & COMp. L. Q. 175 (1983).
39 Id. at arts. 7, 9-11, 13, 14.
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
one contracting state are taxable in the other contracting state only
to the extent that the profits are attributable to a permanent estab-
lishment in the other state through which the enterprise conducts its
business. 40 The Treaty does not define "business profits," but im-
plicitly excludes from the term types of income governed by other
provisions of the Treaty. 4' The Treaty provides an arm's-length
standard for determining whether profits are attributable to a perma-
nent establishment. 42 Attributable profits are those that an enter-
prise might be expected to realize if it were an independent
enterprise engaged in similar activities under similar conditions and
dealing at arm's length with the enterprise of which it is a permanent
establishment. 43
PRC tax law does not distinguish between business income from
a foreign company conducting business through a locally incorpo-
rated subsidiary and income from a foreign company's subsidiary
with a branch office in the PRC.44 As a result, the Treaty's standard
for attributing business profits is especially helpful to the tax plan-
ner.45 In addition, each contracting state may develop its own
formula for attribution so long as it is consistently applied.46 In
computing profits all actual expenses of the permanent establish-
ment may be deducted.47 Deductions include a reasonable alloca-
tion of executive and administrative expenses, regardless of where
the expenses are incurred. 48 No deduction, however, is allowed for
royalties and interest paid by the permanent establishment to the
head office other than as reimbursements for actual costs incurred. 49
B. Personal Services
Several provisions in the Treaty govern the taxation of income
earned through the performance of services. 50 Article 13 permits a
contracting state to tax the income of a nonresident who provides
40 Id. at art. 7. This tax is patterned after those found in the U.N. and U.S. Model
Treaties. See Zheng, supra note 1, at 751.
41 Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, supra note 4, at art. 7. Income
from certain assets including dividends (art. 9), interest (art. 10), and royalties (art. 11) are
not covered by Article 7. Id. at arts. 5, 7.
42 Zheng, supra note 1, at 753.
43 Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, supra note 4, at art. 7, para. 2.
44 See Foreign Enterprise Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China
[FEITLI, adopted at the Fourth Session of the Fifth National People's Congress on Dec. 13,
1981, reprinted in LONGMAN GROUP LTD., THE CHINA INVESTMENT GUIDE 1984/85 at 437-39
(1984).
45 Cox, supra note 5, at 132.
46 Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, supra note 4, at arts. 6, 7.
47 Id. at art. 7, para. 3. The limitation on reimbursements to the head office of the
enterprise represents a concession by the United States to the revenue interests of devel-
oping countries. See Cox, supra note 5, at 131.
48 Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, supra note 4, at art. 7, para. 3.
49 Id.
50 Id. at arts. 13, 14.
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"professional services" of an "independent character" only when
that person is present for a period exceeding 183 days of the calen-
dar year or has a fixed base regularly available to him in the nonresi-
dent country for the purposes of performing his services. 5 1 Under
Article 14, the income earned by a nonresident employee also may
be taxed by the contracting state if the employee is present within
the state for more than 183 days, he is employed by a resident em-
ployer, or his compensation was paid by a permanent establishment
of the employer. 52 The Treaty provides special taxes and exemp-
tions for directors' fees,53 entertainers and athletes, 54 pensions, 55
governmental services, 56 teachers and researchers,57 and students
and trainees. 58
The PRC's individual income tax imposes progressive rates on
income earned by employees ranging from five to forty-five percent
and a flat rate of twenty percent on most other personal services. 59
The rate structure remains the same under the Treaty.60 Under PRC
individual income tax law, compensation is exempt from tax if the
foreign employee remains in the PRC fewer than ninety days.6 1 The
Treaty extends this period to 183 days.62 In addition, the PRC indi-
vidual income tax exemption applies only to income paid by foreign
employers, 63 while the Treaty applies to both foreign-sourced and
51 Id. at art. 13, para. 1. Professional services include: Independent scientific, liter-
ary, artistic, educational, or teaching activities; and independent activities of physicians,
lawyers, engineers, architects, dentists, and accountants. Id. As a result, a U.S. doctor
present in the PRC for more than 183 days in a calendar year is subject to PRC tax on
income derived in the PRC during that year. See Cox, supra note 5, at 132.
52 Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, supra note 4, at art. 14, para. 2.
53 Id. at art. 15.
54 Id. at art. 16, para. 1.
55 Id. at art. 17.
56 Id. at art. 18.
57 Id. at art. 19.
58 Id. at art. 20. Cox suggests that the imposition of taxes or exemptions for several
categories exists for personal services that the PRC seeks either to encourage or discour-
age. Cox, supra note 5, at 133. For example, the Treaty's exemptions for teachers, re-
searchers, students, and trainees illustrate the PRC's interest in the exchange of ideas
through human capital. Id. PRC students and trainees are attracted to the United States
by the relatively advanced technology and facilities. The same attractions, however, do
not exist for U.S. students and trainees in the PRC. U.S. students are primarily interested
in the PRC's culture, language, and history. Note, supra note 11, at 835 n.90. The exemp-
tion under the Treaty for visiting students and trainees is broader than that provided in
the U.S. and OECD Model Treaties. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 7.
59 See Individual Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China [IITL], Fifth
National People's Cong., 3d sess. (Sept. 10, 1980), reprinted in LONGMAN GROUP LTD., THE
CHINA INVESTMENT GUIDE 1984/85, at 433-34 (1984).
60 Zheng, supra note 1, at 764. Zheng reaches this conclusion because Articles 13 and
14 fail to impose any limitation on tax rates. Id.
61 See Gelatt & Pomp, supra note 38, at 427.
62 Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, supra note 4, at art. 13, para. I.
This aspect of the Treaty offers the taxpayer a distinct advantage over the PRC's domestic
tax law.
63 See Gelatt & Pomp, supra note 38, at 430.
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PRC-sourced income. 64
As a result, the Treaty benefits individuals who engage in in-
dependent services and receive income for their services in the PRC
only by extending the exemption period. 65 For example, a U.S. law-
yer is exempt from fees paid by PRC clients in the PRC for 183 days,
even though the service and the payment are made in the PRC. 66 A
U.S. lawyer with a "fixed base" in the PRC, however, is taxable in the
PRC for independent services performed in the PRC. 67
C. Dividends, Interest, and Royalties
Another important feature of the Treaty is its treatment of pas-
sive income from investment assets like dividends, interest, and roy-
alties. Under PRC tax law passive income from investment assets is
subject to differing flat rates of withholding, depending upon the ap-
plicable tax. 68 The U.S. Internal Revenue Code imposes a thirty per-
cent flat rate on the taxpayer. 69 The resident country of the income
recipient also imposes a tax on income received. If the recipient is a
resident of the other contracting state and is the beneficial owner of
the payments, the Treaty limits the amount that may be withheld by
the other contracting state to ten percent of gross dividends and in-
terest paid by a resident company. 70 The Treaty permits the source
country to withhold a certain percentage of tax from the income
when it is paid. 7' While the payer of dividends must be a resident of
the withholding country, 72 interest and royalties are subject to with-
holding regardless of the payer's residence when the payer operates
64 Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, supra note 4, at art. 13, para. 1.
65 Zheng, supra note 1, at 765.
66 See Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, supra note 4, at art. 13, para.
i.
67 See id. According to the Technical Explanation of the Treaty, a "fixed base" is
analogous to "permanent establishment," defined in Article 5. A fixed base does not in-
clude a hotel room unless the room is used as an office or work site on a continuing basis.
Profits attributable to a fixed base are taxed on a net basis using arm's-length principles.
TECHNICAL ExPLANATION, supra note 27. See Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxa-
tion, supra note 4, at art. 7.
68 The PRC's Foreign Enterprise Income Tax law provides for a 20% rate of with-
holding, while the PRC's Joint Venture Income Tax provides for a 10% rate, and the
Individual Income tax rate provides for a 20% rate. Cox, supra note 5, at 133 n. 183. For a
detailed discussion of PRC taxation of dividends, interest, and royalties, see Zheng, supra
note 1, at 758-63
69 I.R.C. §§ 861, 871, 881 (1987).
70 Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, supra note 4, at arts. 9, 10.
Under Article 22 the withholding tax is credited against the tax imposed by the recipient
country. Id. at art. 22, para. 1. The business profits remain taxable under Article 7.
71 Zheng, supra note 1, at 756. The withholding rates allowed in the source state on
dividends, interest, and royalties are set'at 10% of the gross amount. The treatment of
these types of income are favorable for the source country and represents another provi-
sion favorable to the PRC. Note, supra note 11, at 384-85.
72 Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, supra note 4, at art. 9.
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a permanent establishment in the other country. 73
For income to constitute a dividend under the Treaty, the in-
come must be paid by a company and be income from a share of
equity or similar corporate right. 74 Article 10 defines "interest" as
income from "debt claims of every kind," including government se-
curities. 75 The Treaty defines "royalties" broadly as income of any
kind received as consideration for the use of, or the right to use,
intellectual property, industrial, commercial or scientific equipment,
or technical know-how. 76 PRC tax law, however, only includes the
fee derived from intellectual property or industrial, commercial, or
scientific equipment as royalties. 77 Because the Treaty uses the term
"technical know-how," 7 8 payments otherwise treated as personal
services could be interpreted as royalties under the Treaty.7 9
The Treaty's rules with respect to taxation of dividends, inter-
est, and royalties are similar to those in the U.N. Model Treaty. 80
The source country may withhold dividend and interest income pro-
73 Id. at art. 9, para. 4. In this case either the provision governing business profits,
Article 7, or the provision governing independent personal services, Article 13, applies.
Id. The Treaty clarifies for the tax planner the rules of source income that are undefined
under PRC tax law. Zheng, supra note 1, at 757. Zheng noted:
It is clear under Chinese law that a royalty paid by a Chinese entity in Peking
to a United States business in New York is Chinese-source income. It is un-
clear, however, whether the same royalty is considered to be Chinese-source
income if it is paid by a Detroit branch of the Chinese entity and the technol-
ogy for which the royalty is paid is used by that branch. Under the Treaty,
the latter payment will be treated as United States-source income.
Id.
74 Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, supra note 4, at art. 9, para. 3.
Zheng asserts that the share of profits of an equity joint venture should be deemed a divi-
dend under the Treaty. Zheng, supra note 1, at 755. Under Article 9 dividends are defined
as:
Income from shares or other rights, not being debt-claims, participating in
profits, as well as income from other corporate rights which is subjected to
the same taxation treatment as income from shares by the taxation laws of
the Contracting State of which the company making the distribution is a
resident.
Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, supra note 4, at art. 9, para. 3.
75 Id. at art. 10, para. 4. There is an exemption from withholding when interest pay-
ments are made to the government of the other contracting state, its central bank, any
wholly government-owned financial institution, any financial institution wholly owned by a
resident of the other contracting state, or with respect to debt claims indirectly financed by
the government or its banks. Id. at art. 10, para. 3.
76 Id. at art. 1I, para. 3.
77 Zheng, supra note 1, at 756.
78 Both the U.S. and U.N. Model Treaties exclude this term from their definitions.
Cox, supra note 5, at 136 n.2 10.
79 Cox, supra note 5, at 136.
80 U.N. Model Double Taxation Convention, supra note 5, at arts. 10-12. Under the
U.N. Model Treaty both the source jurisdiction and the country of residence may tax. Id.
The rate of withholding is left open to negotiation between contracting states. Id. Under
the OECD Model Treaty dividend taxation is subject to ownership requirements and a
withholding rate limit, interest may be taxed in the source country subject to rate limits
and permanent establishment rules, and royalties are taxable only by the recipient state.
OECD Model Double Taxation Convention, supra note 5, at arts. 10-12. The U.S. Model
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vided the recipient of the payment is its beneficial owner. 8 1 In some
instances, however, these payments are treated as business profits or
income from professional services. For example, payments received
by a U.S. enterprise in the PRC with a permanent establishment in
the PRC are treated as business profits under Article 7.82 Likewise, if
a U.S. lawyer performs independent services from a fixed base in the
PRC and the payments are connected effectively with the fixed base
then Article 13 applies. 8 3
IV. Coordinated Tax Measures
To avoid double taxation and tax evasion, the Treaty incorpo-
rates coordinated tax measures such as tax credits and nondiscrimi-
nation, mutual agreement, and exchange of information provisions.
Double taxation arises when each treaty partner asserts jurisdiction
to tax the same item of income. 84 The problem occurs because each
contracting state has different bases for jurisdiction. 8 5 Some treaties
contain provisions that expressly prevent double taxation. For exam-
ple, under the Treaty business profits of an enterprise of one country
are taxable in the other country only to the extent they are attributa-
ble to a permanent establishment. 86
A. Tax Credits
Article 22 of the Treaty relieves enterprises from double taxa-
tion by requiring a credit against income taxes payable to one treaty
partner for income taxes paid to the other treaty partner.8 7 Separate
credit rules apply to both PRC and U.S. residents. Under the Treaty
the United States must give a credit to both U.S. residents and citi-
zens.8 8 When a U.S. company owns at least ten percent of the voting
interest in a PRC company from which it receives dividends, the
United States must give an additional credit for the income tax paid
to the PRC by the U.S. company with respect to the profits from
which the dividends were paid. 8 9 The credit to PRC entities extends
Treaty differs with respect to ownership and withholding percentages. U.S. Model Double
Taxation Convention, supra note 5, at arts. 10-12.
81 Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, supra note 4, at art. 9, para. 2,
art 10, para. 2, art. 11, para. 2.
82 Id. at art. 9, para. 4, art. 10,. para. 5, art. 11, para. 4.
83 Id. at art. 13.
84 BISCHEL & FEINSCHREIBER, supra note 8, at 5-6.
85 Id.
86 Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, supra note 4, at art. 7, para. 1.
87 Id. at art. 22, para. 2.
88 Id.
89 Id. The Internal Revenue Code grants credits for foreign income in any event. See
I.R.C. §§ 901-08 (1987). Article 22, therefore, serves to confirm the existing foreign tax
credit rules in the Internal Revenue Code. The Senate Committee pointed out that the
Treaty might override U.S. tax law allowing a U.S. citizen to convert U.S.-source income to
PRC-source income in order to inflate his foreign tax credit. See Cox, supra note 5, at 139.
538 [VOL. 13
U.S.-CHINA TAX TREATY
only to residents, regardless of nationality.90 The amount of PRC
credit is also limited to the amount of income tax payable.9 ' The
practical effect of this limitation is to preclude carryover of excess
credits, which is not allowed by PRC domestic tax law.92
The Treaty's tax credit provision is helpful to the tax planner in
three ways. First, the Treaty clearly states that the PRC must allow a
credit for U.S. income taxes. 9 3 Second, because the Treaty specifies
rules determining sources of income, the Treaty's tax credit rules are
easier to implement than PRC credit rules. 9 4 Third, the Treaty re-
quires the PRC to extend foreign tax credits for U.S. federal income
tax.95 PRC tax law is silent with respect to whether local and na-
tional foreign taxes are creditable. 96
B. Nondiscrimination Provisions
In addition to the mandatory tax credit, the Treaty has a nondis-
crimination clause that prohibits both the United States and the PRC
from taxing residents or permanent establishments in one con-
tracting state either less heavily or more heavily than they are taxed
in the other contracting state. 9 7 The Treaty also states that a con-
tracting state must permit residents to deduct, for purposes of deter-
mining taxable profits, interest, royalties, and other disbursements
paid to residents of contracting states in the same manner as the
state's own residents. 9 8 Because Article 23 prohibits more burden-
some treatment, the Treaty does not prevent a contracting state from
receiving more favorable tax treatment such as the reduced tax rates
applied to foreign investors in the PRC Special Economic Zones. 9 9
90 Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, supra note 4, at art. 22, para. 1.
91 Id.
92 Zheng, supra note 1, at 768.
93 Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, supra note 4, at art. 22, para. 1.
PRC tax law is silent regarding tax credits for foreign income. See Zheng, supra note 1, at
769.
94 Zheng, supra note 1, at 769.
95 Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, supra note 4, at art. 2, para. 1.
96 Zheng, supra note 1, at 769.
97 Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, supra note 4, at art. 23, para. 1.
Paragraph one of Article 23 provides:
1. Nationals of a Contracting State shall not be subjected in the other Con-
tracting State to any taxation or any requirements connected therewith which
is other or more burdensome than the taxation and connected requirements
to which nationals of that other Contracting State in the same circumstances
are or may be subjected. This provision shall, notwithstanding the provi-
sions of Article 1, apply to persons, who are not residents of one.or both of
the Contracting States.
Id.
98 Id. at art. 23, para. 3.
99 Zheng; supra note 1, at 770. PRC taxes for domestic enterprises are typically
higher than the 15% rate applied to foreign investors in the PRC Special Economic Zones.
Id. PRC domestic enterprises are subject to a progressive income tax ranging from 10% to
55%. The tax differential reflects the PRC's current economic structure based on socialist
1988]
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As a result, the Treaty allows U.S. enterprises to take advantage of
the preferential tax treatment accorded to foreign enterprises that
operate in the PRC Special Economic Zones.
C. Mutual Agreement Procedures
The Treaty obligates authorities in both countries to attempt to
resolve by mutual agreement any difficulties or doubts over an inter-
pretation or application of the Treaty.' 00 Three provisions are pro-
vided through which a taxpayer may seek dispute resolution and
Treaty interpretation by the mutual agreement of the competent au-
thorities of each contracting state.' 0 ' In addition, Article 24 pro-
vides a legal framework through which the Treaty's principles are
administered. 10 2 Because Article 24 requires the participation of
both contracting states to solve problems, the Treaty serves to in-
crease communication between the two countries. Under Article 24,
a taxpayer may present his case to the competent authorities within
three years of the initial date of notification of the action that re-
sulted in his being subjected to an inappropriate tax.' 03 This re-
quirement is especially significant given U.S. businesses' lack of
familiarity with PRC tax practice and procedure. 0 4
D. Exchanges of Information
Article 25 specifically permits the authorities in each contracting
state to prevent tax evasion and fraud.10 5 Both the United States and
the PRC can gain access to financial information concerning the tax-
payer's foreign-sourced income. The Treaty sets broad limits on the
information that can be exchanged-anything necessary to carry out
the provisions of the Treaty or the domestic laws of the contracting
states is accessible. 10 6 Theoretically, any information concerning
residents of third countries is accessible under the Treaty.' 0 7 The
Treaty, however, states that neither the PRC nor the United States is
ownership. The preferential tax treatment applied to foreign investors in the Special Eco-
nomic Zones is designed to encourage foreign investment and commercial exchange with
developed countries. Id.
100 Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, supra note 4, at art. 24.
1l Id. at art. 24.
102 Id. at art. 24, para. 1. Under Article 24 a person who considers the actions of
either the United States or the PRC not to be in accordance with the Treaty is allowed to
present his case to the competent authority of the nation of which he is a resident or a
national. If the objection to the tax appears to be justified and if the competent authority
is unable to arrive at a solution, the competent authority must resolve the case through
consultation with the competent authority of the other contracting state. Any solution
must be implemented regardless of domestic law time, limitations. Id. at art. 25, para. 2.
103 Id.
104 Zheng, supra note 1, at 770.





obligated under the Treaty to supply to the other state information
that normally is privileged or otherwise unavailable under the state's
domestic laws.' 08 In addition, the contracting parties are not obli-
gated to exchange trade and business secrets.' 0 9
V. Protocols
Senators opposed to ratification of the Treaty argued that the
PRC could be exploited as a tax haven because the Treatydoes not
adequately discourage treaty shopping. 110 Treaty shopping occurs
when business entities of third countries that do not have tax treaties
with the United States, or have treaties whose terms are less
favorable, establish enterprises in other contracting states solely for
the purpose of enjoying the treaty's benefits."' The PRC and the
United States signed protocols in 1984 and 1986 to prevent treaty
shopping.
Under the 1984 Protocol a foreign company may not receive tax
benefits for income derived from dividends, interest, and royalties if
the competent authorities agree that the taxpayer became a resident
solely to enjoy the benefits of the Treaty. 112 The Senate Foreign
Relations Committee noted that this provision is much less detailed
and considerably less strict than that of the U.S. Model Treaty." 13
Specifically, the Committee criticized the Treaty on four points:
(1) under the 1984 Protocol only the Treaty benefits provided
may be denied, while the U.S. Model Treaty denies all benefits;
(2) the Protocol applies only to foreign companies, while the
U.S. Model Treaty applies to all business organizations;
(3) the Protocol is dependent on the cooperation of both par-
ties' competent authorities to deny benefits, while the U.S. Model
Treaty is self-executing; and
(4) the Treaty's standard for denying benefits is largely subjec-
tive, while the U.S. version contains several objective tests providing
relative certainty as to who will be denied benefits. 114
108 Id. Paragraph 2 of Article 25 provides that in no case shall the provisions of para-
graph I be construed so as to impose on a contracting state the obligation:
(a) to carry out administrative measures at variance with the laws and
administrative practice of that or of the other Contracting State;
(b) to supply information which is not obtainable under the laws or in
the normal course of the administration of that or of the other Contracting
State.
Id. at art. 25, para. 2.
109 Id.
1 10 See Senate Fails to Act on New China Tax Treaty Before Adjournment Despite Business Lobby,
3 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 61 (Jan. 8, 1986).
1 1 1 BISCHEL & FEINSCHREIBER, supra note 8, at 272-75.
112 1984 Protocol, supra note 7, at para. 7.
113 See U.S. Model Double Taxation Convention, supra note 5, at art. 16.
114 SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 36-37.
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The U.S. Treasury Department argued that treaty shopping was
unlikely to occur because of the PRC's currency and investment con-
trols and limited network of treaties." 15 The Senate Committee ac-
cepted the Treasury's argument, but cautioned that the PRC's
currency and investment controls might not continue. According to
the Committee, PRC law is changing rapidly, and therefore, the
United States should monitor all changes to ensure that the Treaty
provides no opportunity for treaty shopping. 1 6
Because ratification by the full Senate was in jeopardy, 1 7 the
1986 Protocol was recharacterized as an interpretation of the provi-
sions of the 1984 Protocol. 1 8 Like the U.S. Model Treaty, the 1986
Protocol applies to all business entities. The 1986 Protocol, how-
ever, has different methods for determining eligibility for treaty ben-
efits. 'l9 The first method requires that more than fifty percent of the
entity deriving the income be owned by residents of the contracting
states and that the entity not make substantial payments to residents
of third countries.120 The second method for eligibility requires that
the entity's "principal class of shares" be subject to "substantial and
regular trading on a recognized stock exchange."' 12 1 The final
method is a restatement of the 1984 Protocol standard that required
the competent authorities to find a "valid business purpose."122
Under each method consultation with the competent authorities is
still required. Nevertheless, upon failure to reach a mutual.determi-
nation one contracting state now can unilaterally deny benefits.' 23
The 1986 Protocol, therefore, alleviates the concerns expressed
by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The alternative meth-
ods for eligibility are more in line with those of the U.S. Model
Treaty and make tax treatment less uncertain. In addition, the
United States is no longer required to scrutinize changes in PRC law
because the Protocol adequately discourages treaty shopping.
VI. Conclusion
The Treaty represents a commitment on the part of the PRC
and the United States to increase economic cooperation. This com-
mitment is especially apparent in the Treaty's coordinated tax meas-
ures such as tax credits, nondiscrimination provisions, mutual
115 See TECHNICAL EXPLANATION, supra note 27. For a discussion of laws eliminating
the incentive to treaty shop, see Cox, supra note 5, at 125.
116 SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 37.
117 Id. at 14.
118 See 1986 Protocol, supra note 9.
119 See U.S. Model Double Taxation Convention, supra note 5, at art. 16.
120 1986 Protocol, supra note 9, at para. 1.
121 Id. This method has been interpreted to require that the entity be a resident and a
publicly traded company. Cox, supra note 5, at 127.
122 1986 Protocol, supra note 9, at para. 2.
123 Id. at para. 4.
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agreement arrangements, and exchanges of information provisions
that call for long term cooperation between the PRC and the United
States. While the Treaty limits both countries' authority to tax vari-
ous types of income, the Treaty clarifies the taxation of businesses
maintaining permanent establishments in the PRC. 124 Under the
Treaty the PRC may tax the world-wide profits of a U.S. company's
subsidiary incorporated in the PRC. But when a branch office of a
U.S. company is located in the PRC, only the business profits attribu-
table to the permanent establishment are taxable.
By clarifying the taxing jurisdictions of the United States and the
PRC, the Treaty provides a sense of certainty necessary for tax plan-
ning by U.S. enterprises.125 The benefits of the Treaty to U.S. com-
panies, however, are diminished by the Treaty's lack of a tax-sparing
mechanism to preclude a contracting state from taxing its own busi-
nesses on income taxed by the other contracting state. As a result,
companies in developed countries with income tax treaties contain-
ing tax-sparing provisions have an economic advantage over U.S.
businesses with permanent establishments in the PRC. 126 Even with-
out a tax-sparing provision, the Treaty facilitates commercial ex-
changes between the PRC and the United States and attracts U.S.
capital and technology to assist further PRC economic development
and modernization. 2 7 Adoption of the Treaty signals an effort by
the United States and the PRC to coordinate transnational tax meas-
ures in order to increase economic cooperation by providing stabil-
ity128 and predictability in a relatively new arena for U.S.
enterprises.' 29 In addition, the Treaty further opens the door for
the United States to gain closer political and economic ties with one
124 PRC tax law is ambiguous and constantly changing in this area. See Zheng, supra
note 1, at 773.
125 Kelly, supra note 15, at 124.
126 See Comment, The Effects of Tax-Sparing on United States Business in China, 21 U.S.F. L.
REV. 393, 411 (1987). The 1986 Protocol, however, incorporates a tax-sparing credit if
U.S. law is amended or a tax-sparing credit is employed in treaties with other countries.
Id. The Foreign Relations Committee Report suggests that the United States incorporated
this provision both to minimize interference with incentives offered by the PRC and to
remain consistent with U.S. tax policy with other developing nations. This additional
agreement goes beyond existing agreements between the United States and other devel-
oping countries. SENATE REPORT, supra note 7. The absence of a tax-sparing provision is
considered the PRC's most substantial concession. Note, supra note 11, at 388.
127 The Treaty lowers tax rates and eliminates double taxation. See Agreement for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation, supra note 4, at art. 22, para. 1.
128 The PRC and the United States must uphold the Treaty for at least five years. Id.
at art. 28.
129 U.S. investment in the PRC has developed only during the last several years. U.S.
trade with the PRC the year before the signing of the Treaty represented less than 3% of
the total U.S. trade with Asian nations. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1987, at 794-95 (1987).'
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130 See Kelly, supra note 15, at 104 (pointing out that the adoption of the Treaty indi-
cates the United States' recognition of the PRC's status as a unique developing country);
Note, supra note 11, at 384 (arguing that the Treaty illustrates that the United States is
willing to make economic concessions to the PRC to facilitate better political relations).
The politicization of the U.S.-PRC agreement is not in accord with U.S. policy to avoid
favoritism in international economic agreements. Note, supra note 11, at 391-92.
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